VZCZCXRO3045 OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHTRO DE RUEHJA #1833 2710326 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 270326Z SEP 08 FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0221 INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 3106 RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 1339 RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 1309 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 2284 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2553 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 3127 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001833

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR P, EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, NEA, NEA/IR, IO, IO/UNP, IO/T (VON BEHREN)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2018
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP ID IR
SUBJECT: UNSC IRAN RESOLUTION--PRESSING FOR INDONESIAN SUPPORT

Classified By: DCM John Heffern, reasons 1.4(b+d).

- 11. (C) SUMMARY: On September 27, DCM delivered reftel demarche urging support for the UNSC resolution on Iran's nuclear program to Secretary General Imron Cotan, the number-three official at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU). He underscored the importance of a 15-0 vote and pressed the GOI to join the international consensus on this matter. Cotan said Indonesia understood the U.S. position and promised to review the matter further with other senior GOI officials. He voiced Indonesia's long-standing doubts that Iran's nuclear program was aimed at developing nuclear weapons. Cotan did not commit to a position on the draft resolution. END SUMMARY.
- 12. (C) The DCM delivered ref A demarche urging support for the draft UN Security Council resolution on Iran's nuclear program to Secretary General Imron Cotan, the number-three official at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU) early on Saturday, September 27. The DCM underscored the importance of a 15-0 vote on the resolution to send a strong signal that the international community is unified in calling for Iran to meet all of its nonproliferation obligations. He also noted that since the passage of UNSCR 1803 in March 2008 that Iran continued to defy the international community and still refused to cooperate fully with the IAEA. Indonesia's hope that its abstention on resolution 1803 would help lead the Iranians to meet these obligations—their stated rationale for abstaining at the time—had failed to spur Iranian action. The DCM urged Indonesia to support the resolution.
- 13. (C) Cotan said he understood the USG position and promised to review the matter with other senior GOI officials, including FM Wirajuda who is in New York for the UNGA. He said Indonesia would be concerned about Iran's efforts to develop a nuclear weapon if it could be proven this was the real intent of Iran's nuclear program. He suggested that USG officials raise the matter directly with the Indonesian delegation in New York.
- $\P4$. (C) The DCM underscored that the P-5 members of the UNSC were unified on this issue and that Indonesia did not want to be seen as flouting this international consensus. When

pressed, Cotan said Indonesia would do as much as possible to accommodate U.S. concerns on the matter but--pending further consultations--he did not commit to a position on the resolution.

HUME